Speaker: Jeff Speaks
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
Date: Friday, September 12, 2010
Time: 4:30 pm to 6:00 pm
Location: 118 Humanities Building
Abstract: Whether or not the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their contents, some combinations of phenomenal character and content are impossible. This can be used to argue against, not just anti-intentionalist views of perceptual content, but also some intentionalist theories: in particular, Fregean theories and theories which make use of appearance properties. It is also a problem for some versions of functionalism.
Note: Jeff will be visiting prof. O’Callaghan’s Philosophy of Perception seminar on Friday from 1:00 to 4:00 pm (Hum 227). The session will be open to interested faculty, students, and visitors, and it will operate as a workshop session on selections from a book in progress on varieties of intentionalism about phenomenal character. Please come! Jeff will give a brief, 15 to 20 min, introductory presentation. Then the floor will open for discussion. It is requested that participants review the selected material in advance.